Is It Curtains for Joe Camel - A Critical Analysis of the 1995 FDA Proposed Rule to Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sales to Protect Children and Adolescents by Harder, Charles J.
Loyola of Los Angeles 
Entertainment Law Review 
Volume 16 Number 2 Article 4 
9-1-1995 
Is It Curtains for Joe Camel - A Critical Analysis of the 1995 FDA 
Proposed Rule to Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and 
Sales to Protect Children and Adolescents 
Charles J. Harder 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles J. Harder, Is It Curtains for Joe Camel - A Critical Analysis of the 1995 FDA Proposed Rule to 
Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sales to Protect Children and Adolescents, 16 Loy. L.A. Ent. 
L. Rev. 399 (1995). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol16/iss2/4 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ 
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles 
Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and 
Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. 
COMMENTS
IS IT CURTAINS FOR JOE CAMEL?
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1995 FDA
PROPOSED RULE TO RESTRICT TOBACCO
ADVERTISING, PROMOTION AND SALES TO
PROTECT CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
According to medical studies conducted by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, cigarettes and other tobacco
products are responsible for more than 400,000 deaths each year due to
cancer, respiratory illnesses, heart disease and other health problems related
to smoking or the use of smokeless tobacco products.' Cigarettes kill
more Americans each year than AIDS, alcohol, car accidents, murders,
suicides, illegal drugs, and fires combined.2
Of the forty-six million Americans who currently smoke cigarettes3
and the five million who use smokeless tobacco products (including
chewing tobacco and snuff),4 over three million smokers and one million
smokeless tobacco users are under eighteen years of age.' This is the case
even though all states prohibit the sale of tobacco products to persons under
1. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality and
Years of Potential Life Lost-United States, 1990, 42 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. RPT.
645 (1993) [hereinafter DHHS, Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality].
2. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE
ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 3 (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 1994).
Collectively, AIDS, alcohol, car accidents, murders, suicides, illegal drugs, and fires cause nearly
251,000 deaths per year. Id.
3. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Cigarette Smoking Among Adults-United
States. 1993, 43 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. RPT. 925 (1994) [hereinafter DHHS,
Cigarette Smoking Among Adults].
4. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Use of Smokeless Tobacco Among
Adults-United States, 1991, 42 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. RPT. 263 (1993) [hereinafter
DHHS, Use of Smokeless Tobacco].
5. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG
PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 58 (1994) [hereinafter SGR 1994].
400 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
the age of eighteen, and a few states prohibit cigarette sales to persons
under nineteen or twenty-one.6
In the last ten years, while most adults decreased their use of
cigarettes, smoking by American teenagers and younger children failed to
decline.7 This fact is even more significant when one considers that
anyone who does not begin smoking by childhood or adolescence is
unlikely to ever begin.8 Eighty-eight percent of smoking adults have their
first cigarette before age eighteen, and seventy-one percent have already
become daily smokers by that age.9 Moreover, the earlier a person begins
to smoke, the more likely that person is to become a heavy smoker in later
years. "
In an effort to reduce by half the number of underage smokers, the
United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") proposed a rule on
August 10, 1995, to implement the following measures:
(1) prohibit, by federal law, all sales of tobacco products to persons
under eighteen years of age and require all vendors of tobacco products to
verify, by photographic identification, the age of all young buyers;
(2) ban all cigarette vending machines, self-service displays, mail
order sales, free samples, and the sale of cigarettes in quantities of fewer
than twenty;
(3) ban all outdoor advertisements within 1000 feet of a school,
restrict all other outdoor and in-store advertisements to black and white text
only, and restrict all advertisements in magazines and other publications,
in which fifteen percent or more of the readership is persons under the age
of eighteen, to black and white text only;
(4) prohibit a sponsored event (such as a sporting event) from being
identified with a cigarette or smokeless tobacco product brand name (such
as Marlboro or Camel) or any other brand-identifying characteristic (such
as the "Marlboro Man" or "Joe Camel")--only the tobacco company name
(such as Philip Morris or R.J. Reynolds) could be used as the official
sponsor;
6. REGULATIONS RESTRICTING THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIGARETTES AND
SMOKELESS TOBACCO PRODUCTS TO PROTECT CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, 60 Fed. Reg.
41,314, 41,315 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807) (proposed Aug. 11,
1995) (citing COALITION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, STATE LEGISLATED ACTIONS ON TOBACCO
ISSUES, App. G (1993)).
7. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 8.
8. SGR 1994, supra note 5, at 5.
9. Id. at 67.
10. Emanuela Taioli & Ernst L. Wynder, Effect of the Age at Which Smoking Begins on
Frequency of Smoking in Adulthood, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 968, 969 (1991).
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(5) prohibit the manufacturing or sale of any non-tobacco product
(such as a T-shirt, cap, or sporting good) displaying the brand name of a
cigarette or smokeless tobacco product--though the tobacco company name
could be displayed on such merchandise; and
(6) require all tobacco manufacturers to contribute to a $150 million
national educational campaign fund to purchase anti-smoking adver-
tisements directed at people under eighteen."
The FDA has asserted jurisdiction over the issue by declaring that
nicotine is a "drug" and tobacco products are drug delivery "devices" under
their respective definitions in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA") 12 and, as such, cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products that
contain nicotine are subject to regulation by the FDA. 3 There are
presently four pending lawsuits challenging the legality of the FDA action:
Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA,'4 American Advertising Federation v.
Kessler,'5 United States Tobacco Co. v. FDA,16 and National Association
of Convenience Stores v. FDA. 7 These actions were filed in the United
States District Court, Middle District of North Carolina and have been
assigned to United States District Judge William L. Osteen, Sr.
This Comment will analyze the major legal issues concerning the
FDA's proposed rule. Additionally, it will argue that the proposal is both
constitutionally and jurisdictionally sound, with the exception of the
proposed national educational campaign fund. Part II will provide an
overview of federal efforts to restrict the promotion of tobacco. Part III
1I. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,326-28 (1995).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(I)-(h)(3) (1994).
13. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,465-66 (1995).
14. The full title of this action is: Coyne Beahm, Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
Liggett Group Inc., Lorillard Tobacco Co., Philip Morris Inc., and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
United States FDA and David A. Kessler, M.D., Comm'r of FDA. (Civil Action File Number
2:95CV00591) (amended complaint filed Sept. 7, 1995).
15. The full title of this action is: American Advertising Fed'n; American Ass'n of
Advertising Agencies, Inc.; Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc.; Magazine Publishers of Am.;
Outdoor Advertising Ass'n of Am.; Point of Purchase Advertising Inst. v. David A. Kessler,
M.D., Comn'r, FDA; United States FDA; and Donna Shalala, Secretary, U.S. Dep't. of Health
and Human Services (Civil Action File Number 2:95CV00593) (amended complaint filed Sept.
27, 1995).
16. The full title of this action is United States Tobacco Co.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.; Conwood Co., L.P.; National Tobacco Co., L.P.; The Pinkerton Tobacco Co.; Swisher Int'l,
Inc.; Central Carolina Grocers, Inc.; Davenport, J.T., Inc.; N.C. Tobacco Distrib. Comm., Inc. v.
United States FDA; David A. Kessler, M.D., Comm'r of FDA (Civil Action File Number
2:95CV00665) (complaint filed Sept. 19, 1995).
17. The full title of this action is National Ass'n of Convenience Stores, ACME Retail, Inc.
v. David A. Kessler, M.D., Comm'r, FDA, United States FDA (Civil Action File Number
2:95CV00706) (complaint filed Oct. 4, 1995).
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will discuss the problem of tobacco use by young people. Part IV will
outline the specific provisions in the FDA's proposed rule. Parts V and VI
will discuss the constitutional and jurisdictional issues, respectively. Part
VII will analyze the legality of the educational campaign fund. Finally,
Part VIII will give background on Judge Osteen's relevant history on
tobacco-related issues and litigation.
II. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON
TOBACCO PROMOTION
A. Current Federal Law
Ever since tobacco was found to have adverse affects on human
health, Congress has enacted legislation to restrict the promotion of tobacco
products.' 8 In 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act ("the Cigarette Act") which required cigarette packages and
advertisements to feature the warning label: "CAUTION: CIGARETTE
SMOKING MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH."' 19 The
Cigarette Act has subsequently been amended to feature a variety of other,
sterner warning messages." The Cigarette Act also requires the Secretary
of Health and Human Services ("Secretary") to establish a program to
research the effects of smoking on human health, develop materials for
informing the public of such effects, and biennially report to Congress
regarding federal activities undertaken pursuant to the Cigarette Act.
2 '
In 1970, Congress amended the Cigarette Act by adopting the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act,22 making it "unlawful to advertise
18. The statutes discussed herein are not an entire catalogue of all federal law relating to
tobacco regulation but merely those federal laws that relate directly to the subject matter of the
1995 FDA proposed rule.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994).
20. 15 U.S.C. section 1333 requires one of the following messages to be printed on all
cigarette packages and advertisements:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
Id. § 1333.
21. Id. § 1341.
22. Id. § 1335.
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cigarettes . . . on any medium of electronic communication subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission."23  This
amendment effectively banned all television and radio advertisements for
cigarettes as of January 1, 1971.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act24 ("the Smokeless Act") which established a federal
program to regulate the promotion and sale of smokeless tobacco. The
Smokeless Act requires warning labels to be placed on all packages and
advertisements of smokeless tobacco products, 25 and bans advertisements
for smokeless tobacco products from all electronic media, including
television and radio, within the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC").26 The Smokeless Act also directs the Secretary to
develop and carry out educational programs regarding the dangers to human
health from the use of smokeless tobacco 2 7 and to make such programs
available to states, local governments, school systems, and the media.28
The Smokeless Act further directs the Secretary to conduct and support
research on the effect of smokeless tobacco on human health and collect,
analyze, and disseminate that information.
2 9
B. Recent Unsuccessful Federal Legislation
In recent years, legislation has been introduced in Congress to create
additional restrictions on cigarette and smokeless tobacco promotion. In
1987, Congress considered bills H.R. 127230 and H.R. 15323! which
23. In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, six radio stations brought suit against the U.S.
Attorney General seeking a permanent injunction against the 1970 Act, alleging that it violated
their rights under the First Amendment. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), afd mem., 405 U.S.
1000 (1972). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the statute on the
grounds that "product advertising is less vigorously protected than other forms of speech" and that
Congress, pursuant to its powers to regulate interstate commerce, "has the power to prohibit the
advertising of cigarettes in any media." Id. at 584.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-08 (1994).
25. One of the following three labels must be placed on all smokeless tobacco packages and
advertisements (other than outdoor billboard advertising):
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE DISEASE AND TOOTH LOSS
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO CIGARETTES.
Id. § 4402(a)(l)-(2).
26. Id. § 4402(0.
27. Id. § 4401(a)(l)(A).
28. Id. § 4401(a)(l)(B).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 4401(a)(l)(C)-(D) (1994).
30. H.R. 1272, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
31. H.R. 1532, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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would have banned all tobacco advertising, sports sponsorships by tobacco
companies, and the distribution of tobacco samples. Two years later, H.R.
125032 and H.R. 149333 were introduced to impose a "tombstone" format
(black and white text only) on most tobacco advertisements, ban tobacco
brand name sponsorship, and ban the marketing of non-tobacco products
featuring brand names. In 1990, Congress considered H.R. 5041, that
would have imposed a "tombstone" format on most tobacco advertisements,
prohibited tobacco advertisements within 1000 feet of schools, banned
sports sponsorships under tobacco brand names, and prohibited free
distribution of tobacco samples. More recently, in 1993, H.R. 214735 was
introduced to give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products and require
FDA regulation of tobacco advertising, including a sports sponsorship ban.
That same year, Congress considered H.R. 3614,36 which would have
imposed restrictions on tobacco brand name sports sponsorships and
prohibited the free distribution of tobacco samples. However, none of the
above bills received the necessary committee votes to be heard by the full
House of Representatives and thus never became law.
III. THE PROBLEM: TOBACCO CONSUMPTION
BY YOUNG PEOPLE
A. The Effects of Tobacco Advertisements on
Tobacco Consumption by Young People
According to FDA statistics, "each year the cigarette industry loses
about 1.7 million customers in the United States; about 400,000 die from
diseases caused by their smoking and another 1.3 million quit smoking.,
37
One of the industry's primary sources for replacement smokers is young
people. One major study reported that each day 3000 young people
become regular smokers.3"
32. H.R. 1250, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
33. H.R. 1493, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
34. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
35. H.R. 2147, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
36. H.R. 3614, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
37. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,317 (1995) (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 115;
DHHS, Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality, supra note 1, at 645; John P. Pierce et al.,
Trends in Cigarette Smoking in the United States, Projections to the Year 2000, 261 JAMA 61,
65 (1989)).
38. Pierce, supra note 37, at 64.
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According to the FDA, the primary reason why so many young people
begin to smoke is the inundation of pro-tobacco messages from adver-
tisements and other promotional activities. Tobacco products are among
the most heavily advertised products in the United States. In 1993, the
tobacco industry spent $6.2 billion on cigarette and smokeless tobacco
advertising, promotion and marketing.39 According to the FDA:
Tobacco product brand names, logos, and advertising messages
are pervasive, appearing on billboards, on buses and trains, in
magazines and newspapers, and on clothing and other goods.
These ubiquitous images and messages convey to young people
that tobacco use is desirable, socially acceptable, safe, healthy,
and prevalent in society. One study found that 30 percent of 3
years olds [sic] and 91 percent of six year olds associate the
"Joe Camel" cartoon figure with cigarettes. Studies also show
that most young people buy the most heavily advertised cigarette
brands, whereas many adults buy generic or "value category"
cigarette brands, which have little or no image advertising."a
According to the United States Surgeon General, seventy-one percent
of all regular adult smokers began smoking daily by age eighteen; the
average age of becoming a daily smoker is less than eighteen years.4'
Also, those who started smoking by early adolescence are more likely to
be heavy smokers than those who began smoking as adults.42 The FDA
finds these statistics unacceptable because: (1) all states currently prohibit
sales of tobacco products to persons under the age of eighteen;4 3 (2)
nicotine contained in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products is a highly
addictive drug which causes the user to continually use the product over
39. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,315 (1995) (citing FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS
FOR 1993, PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT, at table
3D (1995); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO THE
COMPREHENSIVE SMOKELESS TOBACCO HEALTH EDUCATION ACT OF 1986, at table 4D (1995)).
40. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,315 (1995). See also John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising
Target Young People to Start Smoking? Evidence from California, 266 JAMA 3154 (1991); Paul
M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years, Mickey Mouse and Old
Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145 (1991); DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Changes in
Cigarette Brand Preferences of Adolescent Smokers-United States, 1989-1993, 42 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 577, 579 (1994).
41. SGR 1994, supra note 5, at 67 (the average age is 17.7 years).
42. Taioli & Wynder, supra note 10, at 968-69.
43. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,315 (1995).
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time;" and (3) long-term use of tobacco products causes major health
problems and often leads to premature death.45
B. Health Problems Related to Long-Term
Tobacco Consumption
The FDA cites several studies which link long-term smoking to major
health problems including cancer, respiratory illnesses, and heart disease,
among many others. Cigarette smoking contributes to the risk of heart
attacks, chest pain, and even sudden death.46 Overall, smokers have a
seventy percent greater death rate from coronary heart disease than
nonsmokers.47  Smoking caused approximately 180,000 deaths from
cardiovascular disease in 1990.48 One study estimates that thirty to forty
percent of all coronary heart disease deaths are attributable to smoking.49
With respect to cancer, the United States Surgeon General has
reported that smoking is responsible for about thirty percent of all cancer
related deaths, including eighty-seven percent of all lung cancer deaths and
eighty-two percent of deaths from chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease. 0 Furthermore, a relationship exists between cigarette smoking
and cancers of the larynx, mouth, esophagus, and bladder." Cigarette
smoking is also a probable cause of infertility and peptic ulcer disease, and
contributes to or is associated with cancers of the pancreas, kidney, cervix,
and stomach. 2
Moreover, cigarettes also cause serious pre-natal and post-natal health
problems. Women who smoke are twice as likely to have low birth weight
infants as women who do not smoke. 3 Smoking is also responsible for
44. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
45. See infra part III.B.
46. Carl E. Bartecchi et al., The Human Costs of Tobacco Use, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 907
(1994).
47. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING
CESSATION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, Pub. No. 90-8416, 198 (1990) [hereinafter
SGR 1990].
48. DHHS, Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality, supra note 1, at 645.
49. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,318 (1995) (citing J.E. Fielding, Smoking: Health Effects and Control,
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE 716 (1992)).
50. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,318 (1995) (citing DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REDUCING
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 157, Pub. No. 89-8411 (1989) [hereinafter SGR
1989].
51. SGR 1989, supra note 50, at 20.
52. SGR 1990, supra note 47, at 10.
53. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,319 (1995) (citing J.E. Fielding, Smoking: Health Effects and Control,
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE 725 (1992)).
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intrauterine growth retardation of the fetus,' increased rates of premature
delivery,55 and premature infant death.56 A recent study reported that use
of tobacco products by pregnant women causes 19,000 to 141,000
miscarriages per year." The study also attributes maternal smoking
during pregnancy to approximately two-thirds of all deaths from "sudden
infant death syndrome" and a total of 3100 to 7000 infant deaths per
year.
58
In addition to cigarettes, smokeless tobacco products have also been
linked to damaging health effects. Studies show that use of smokeless
tobacco causes oral cancer and oral leukoplakia and may be associated with
an increased risk of cancer of the esophagus.59 It has also been implicated
in cancers of the gum, mouth, pharynx and larynx.60 Moreover, snuff use
causes gum recession, is associated with discoloration of the teeth, and
long-term use increases the risk of cheek and gum cancers by nearly fifty
times.6
Overall, tobacco use causes over 400,000 deaths per year in the
United States-approximately twenty percent of all deaths nationwide.62
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE 1995
FDA PROPOSED RULE
On August 10, 1995, the FDA proposed a rule to limit the exposure
of young people to tobacco promotion and to ban the sale of tobacco
products, by federal law, to all persons under the age of eighteen.63 This
part will discuss the procedural requirements, purpose, scope, and
substantive provisions of the proposed rule.
54. Patricia H. Shiono et al., Smoking and Drinking During Pregnancy: Their Effects on
Preterm Birth, 255 JAMA 82 (1986).
55. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,319 (1995) (citations omitted).
56. Joseph R. DiFranza & Robert A. Lew, Effect of Maternal Cigarette Smoking on




59. SGR 1994, supra note 5, at 39.
60. Id.
61. Deborah M. Winn et al., Snuff Dipping and Oral Cancer Among Women in the Southern
United States, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 745, 747 (1981).
62. DHHS, Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality, supra note 1, at 645.
63. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995).
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A. Procedural Requirements:
Notice and Comment
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), a federal
administrative agency must provide interested parties with notice and an
opportunity to comment on a proposed rule prior to its promulgation.
64
The FDA has provided notice by publishing in the Federal Register the text
of the proposed rule, entitled: "Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect
Children and Adolescents. 65 In addition, the FDA has published, in the
same issue of the Federal Register, an "Analysis Regarding the Food and
Drug Administration's Jurisdiction Over Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco Products. 66  Interested parties were given the
opportunity to submit written comments and recommendations to the FDA
by January 2, 1996.67
B. Purpose and Scope of the Proposed Rule
The stated purpose of the proposed rule is to "help prevent persons
younger than eighteen years of age from becoming addicted to nicotine,
thereby avoiding the life-threatening consequences often associated with
tobacco use. '68 The scope of the proposed rule is limited to cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products and would not apply to pipe tobacco or cigars
because (1) the FDA claims it does not currently have sufficient evidence
that these products conform to the definition of a drug delivery "device"
under the FDCA, 69 and (2) young people predominantly use cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products.70
64. The APA provides:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register.... (c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation .... (d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall
be made not less than 30 days before its effective date.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (1994).
65. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995).
66. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453 (1995). See discussion infra part VI.
67. 60 Fed. Reg. 53,560 (1995); 60 Fed. Reg. 53,620 (1995).
68. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,322 (1995).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3) (1994).
70. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,322 (1995).
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C. Substantive Provisions of Proposed Rule
The proposed rule attempts to accomplish the above-stated purpose
with a two-pronged approach. Prong one would place restrictions on the
sales of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, making these products less
accessible to young people.7 Prong two would work to reduce the appeal
of tobacco products to young people by restricting advertising and funding
a national educational campaign to deter young people from using tobacco
products.7"
1. Prong One: Restricting the Sale of Tobacco
Products to Young People
Under prong one, the proposed rule would create several restrictions.
First, the proposed rule would prohibit the sale and distribution of
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products to individuals younger than
eighteen.73 To aid in the enforcement of this age restriction, the proposed
rule would require all retailers of tobacco products to verify that purchasers
of tobacco products are at least eighteen years old. Verification would be
achieved by direct visual inspection of each prospective purchaser and
would, if necessary, include the use of a photographic identification card
with a birth date.74
Prong one also would prohibit the retailer or its employees from
selling or distributing single cigarettes and would establish twenty cigarettes
as the minimum package size.75 The FDA reasons that:
[T]he vast majority of cigarette packs in the United States
contain [twenty] cigarettes. The proposal is intended to preclude
firms from manufacturing packages that contain fewer than
[twenty] cigarettes; these packs, sometimes referred to as
"kiddie" packs, usually contain a small number of cigarettes, are
71. Id. at 41,315.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 41,322.
74. Id. at 41,323. The FDA justifies this identification verification provision by citing:
[S]tudies indicate that minors who are able to purchase cigarettes and other tobacco
products from stores are rarely asked to verify their age.... In contrast, in Everett,
WA, where a local ordinance required proof of age if the prospective buyer did not
appear to be of legal age to purchase cigarettes ... tobacco use, among 14 to 17-
year-olds, declined from 25.3 percent to 19.7 percent overall. Id.
60 Fed. Reg. 41,323 (citing M. Ward Hinds, Impact of a Local Ordinance Banning Tobacco Sales
to Minors, 107 PUB. HEALTH REP. 355 (1992)).
75. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,324 (1995).
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easier to conceal, and are less expensive than full-size packs.
(Young people, who generally have little disposable income, can
be particularly sensitive to the price of cigarettes and may
choose not to smoke as the price increases).
7 6
Also, prong one would prohibit "impersonal" modes of sale, requiring
that "cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products be sold only in a direct,
face-to-face exchange between the retailer or the retailer's employees and
the consumer."" The proposed rule specifically would prohibit all
cigarette vending machines, self-service displays, mail order sales, and mail
order redemption of coupons.7"
2. Prong Two: Reducing the Appeal of Tobacco
Products to Young People
To reduce the appeal of tobacco products to young people, prong two
would impose several requirements on tobacco manufacturers. First, the
proposed rule would require each tobacco manufacturer to contribute to a
national educational campaign fund.79 The campaign fund would purchase
advertisements in media markets targeting young people to "combat the
effects of the pervasive and positive imagery that has for decades helped
to foster a youth market for tobacco products.' ,80  The FDA cites to
similar programs in Vermont and California which have successfully
decreased cigarette consumption.8
The media program would operate by establishing a total fund of $150
million per year, raised by contributions from all cigarette and smokeless
tobacco manufacturers. Each manufacturer would contribute an amount of
money proportionate to its share of the total advertising and promotional
expenditures of the cigarette and smokeless tobacco industry. Thus, a
manufacturer whose expenditures equal ten percent of the total industry




78. Id. The FDA cites several studies which indicate that these impersonal modes of sale
are primary sources by which young people obtain tobacco products. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,324-26
(1995).
79. See infra part VII (discussing of the legality of this educational campaign fund).
80. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,326 (1995).
81. Id. at 41,327.
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Under the program, industry members could select from a variety of
messages maintained by the FDA.82 Eighty percent of the media fund
would be spent on television advertisements while the remaining twenty
percent would be placed in other media, such as radio and outdoor
advertising, that target young people. 3
The second requirement of prong two more specifically relates to
advertising. First, it would prohibit all outdoor advertising of tobacco
products, such as billboards, posters, and placards within 1000 feet of an
elementary or secondary school or playground. The FDA reasons that this
provision is necessary to keep advertisements away from areas with a high
concentration of young children.84 Second, it would require that all
cigarette and smokeless tobacco product advertising (including outdoor
advertising, in-store advertising, and advertisements in publications) use
"black text on a white background and nothing else."85  The only
exception to this would be for publications that are read "primarily by
adults." Publications read "primarily by adults" would be allowed to use
imagery and color because the effect of such advertising on young people
would be "nominal. '86  Adult publications include a publication "(a)
[w]hose readers age 18 or older constitute 85 percent or more of the
publication's total readership, or (b) [a publication] that is read by two
million or fewer people under age 18, whichever method results in the
lower number of young people."87
Third, the proposed rule would prohibit the sale or distribution of all
non-tobacco items (such as T-shirts, caps and sporting goods) displaying
a cigarette or smokeless tobacco brand name (such as Marlboro or Camel)
or their identifying characteristic (such as the "Marlboro Man" or "Joe
82. Id.
83. Id. at 41,328.
84. Id. at 41,327.
85. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,335 (1995). The FDA supports this provision by citing studies which
conclude that:
Photographs, pictures, cartoons, and other graphics allow the advertiser to encode
its sales messages in a way that makes the advertisement more compelling and
memorable. Imagery ties the products to a positive visual image .... Adding
visual images to a text advertisement can produce greater recall and a more positive
product rating. Not surprisingly, studies have shown that children and adolescents
react more positively to advertising with pictures and other depictions than to
advertising ... that contains only print or text.
Id. (citing John R. Rossiter, Visual and Verbal Memory in Children's Product Information
Utilization, 3 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 523 (1976)).
86. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,335 (1995).
87. Id.
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Camel").8" However, company names (such as Philip Morris or R.J.
Reynolds) would be permitted on non-tobacco items. Fourth, the rule
would prohibit all contests, lotteries, or games of chance that are linked to
the purchase of a tobacco product.8 9 Fifth, the rule would prohibit any
sponsored event, including athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or
cultural event from being identified with a cigarette or smokeless tobacco
product brand name or any other brand identifying characteristic." An
event could be sponsored in the name of the tobacco company but could
not include any brand name, logo, symbol or other indicia of product
identification.9'
The aforementioned proposed restrictions raise questions as to whether
the First Amendment free speech rights of tobacco manufacturers,
advertisers, and vendors to promote tobacco products would be impinged.
These issues are discussed in Part V.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. Early Commercial Speech Doctrine
Until only recently, the United States Supreme Court refused to
protect commercial speech under the First Amendment. In 1942, the Court
held in Valentine v. Chrestensen92 that the United States Constitution
imposes "no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial
88. Id. at 41,336. The FDA reasons that:
Young people have relatively little disposable income, so promotions are appealing
because they represent a means of "getting something for nothing." ... Some
items [including T-shirts, caps and sporting goods], when used or worn by young
people, also create a new advertising medium--the "walking billboard"--which can
come into schools and other locations where advertising is usually prohibited. A
1992 Gallup survey found that about half of adolescent smokers and one quarter
of non-smokers owned at least one of these items.
Id. (citing The George H. Gallup International Institute, Teen-Age Attitudes and Behavior
Concerning Tobacco-Report of the Findings, at 17, 59 (1992)).
89. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,336 (1995).
90. Id.
91. Id. The FDA notes that:
Sponsorship by cigarette and smokeless tobacco companies associates tobacco use
with exciting, glamorous, or fun events, such as car racing and rodeos. It provides
an opportunity for what sponsorship experts call "embedded advertising" that
actively creates a "friendly familiarity" between tobacco and sports enthusiasts,
many of whom are children and adolescents.
Id.
92. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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advertising., 93  However, by 1975, the Supreme Court had completely
reversed its position. In Bigelow v. Virginia,94 the Court struck down a
Virginia statute that criminalized any advertisement that "encourage[d] or
prompt[ed] the procuring of abortion." 95 In voiding the statute, the Court
reinterpreted Valentine, holding that "[t]he existence of 'commercial
activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of
expression secured by the First Amendment."' 96
The following year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Bigelow in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.97 The
Court stated:
Our question is whether speech which does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction," is so removed from any
"exposition of ideas," and from "truth, science, morality, and
arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government," that it lacks all protection [under
the First Amendment]. Our answer is that it is not.9'
The Court held that pharmacies have a constitutional right to advertise their
businesses so long as the information contained in the advertisement is
truthful and the activity advertised is lawful. 99
B. Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine
It was not until 1980 that the Supreme Court established the modem
commercial speech test. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York,' the Court developed a four prong
test for determining whether commercial speech should be afforded
protection under the First Amendment:r° 0 (1) commercial speech receives
93. Id. at 54.
94. 421 U.S. 809, 812-13 (1975).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 818 (quoting Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966)).
97. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
98. Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957)).
99. Id. at 773.
100. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
101. Id. at 563. The Supreme Court noted, in establishing its four part test, that the
Constitution "accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression. The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on
the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation." Id.
(citations omitted).
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protection only if it is truthful and concerns a lawful activity;0 2 if the
first prong is met, the remaining prongs provide that government's
restriction will be upheld only if (2) the government's interest is "sub-
stantial," (3) the regulation directly advances the government's interest,
103
and (4) the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest. "°
Central Hudson involved a New York State regulation prohibiting all
promotional advertising (even truthful ads) relating to the consumption of
energy (a lawful activity).'0 5 The Court found that the state's interest in
energy conservation was "substantial" and the regulation "directly
advanced" that interest."0 6 However, with respect to prong four, the
Court found that the state's complete suppression of speech was more
restrictive than necessary to further the goal of energy conservation and
was therefore in violation of the First Amendment.'0 7
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto
Rico, 0 8 the Court applied, and substantially weakened, the Central
Hudson test. In Posadas, the Puerto Rico Legislature passed a legislative
ban on all casino advertising directed toward Puerto Rico residents (but
casino advertisements could still be directed at tourists).0 9 In upholding
the advertising restriction, the Court applied the Central Hudson test. First,
it found that the advertising was entitled to First Amendment protection
102. Id. at 563-64. The Supreme Court noted that "[tihe government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech related
to illegal activity." Id. (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978)).
103. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. The Supreme Court stated: "The regulation may not
be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose." Id.
104. Id. The Court noted that "if the governmental interest could be served as well by a
more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive." Id.
(emphasis added). In a 1989 decision, the Supreme Court clarified this fourth prong, stating:
What our decisions require is a .'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends,"-a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; ... that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we
have put it in the other contexts discussed above, a means narrowly tailored to
achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds, we leave it to governmental
decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed.
Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
105. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-59.
106. Id. at 569.
107. Id. at 570. The Court held the regulation more extensive than necessary because it
prohibited all advertisements for electric services, including services that would actually reduce
energy use by diverting demand from less efficient sources. Id.
108. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
109. Id.
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because it concerned a legal activity and was not false or misleading."'
Next, it found that the Puerto Rico Legislature had a substantial interest in
reducing gambling among its residents as a means of reducing local and
organized crime and prostitution."' The Court then found that prong
three was met by deferring to the legislature's judgment that the advertising
restrictions directly advanced the governmental interest. 12 Similarly, the
Court found that prong four was met by deferring to the legislature's
judgment that no less intrusive means would accomplish the government's
goal." 3  By deferring to the legislature's judgment on the two most
stringent prongs, the Court effectively decimated the Central Hudson test.
C. Applicability of Posadas to the
FDA Proposed Rule
It is not entirely clear whether the Posadas decision would apply to
an analysis of the FDA proposed rule. First, the Court gave extreme
deference to the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico because "[a]
rigid rule of deference to interpretations of Puerto Rico law by Puerto Rico
courts is particularly appropriate, given the unique cultural and legal history
of Puerto Rico."' " Second, the Court recognized that, because the Puerto
Rico Legislature had the power to ban gambling in Puerto Rico altogether,
it should also have the power to set limits on the promotional activities of
gambling casinos."'
110. Id. at 340-41.
11. Id. at 341.
112. Id. at 341-42. The Court stated:
The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising
restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at residents of
Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product advertised. We
think the legislature's belief is a reasonable one, and the fact that appellant has
chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates that appellant shares
the legislature's view.
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-42.
However, in Edenfield v. Fane, the Supreme Court held that the Florida Board of
Accounting failed to meet the third prong of the Central Hudson test because its ban on
advertisements by certified public accountants did not directly and materially advance the
government's asserted interests. 507 U.S. 761 (1993). Thus, unlike Posadas, the Edenfield court
declined to defer to the government on Central Hudson's third prong.
113. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 343-44.
114. Id. at 339 n.6 (citing Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1923)).
115. Id. at 346. Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, stated that "it is precisely
because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct
that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct,
but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising." Id.
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In determining whether the Posadas decision applies to an analysis of
the FDA proposed rule, the question is whether the FDA has the power,
under the FDCA, to ban all sales and promotion of tobacco products. The
FDA claims it has the power to do so."6 If the reviewing court--the
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina ("the
reviewing court")--finds that this is the case, it may also find that the FDA
has the power, under Posadas, to regulate the promotion and sale of
tobacco products." 7 However, if the reviewing court finds that the FDA
does not have such power, then Posadas is distinguishable and the Central
Hudson test should be applied without the use of the Court's highly
deferential approach in Posadas.
D. Application of the Central Hudson Test
to the FDA Proposed Rule
The FDA proposed rule would impose restrictions on both the
advertising of tobacco products and other promotional activities. The First
Amendment considerations for these two categories will be discussed
separately.
1. The Constitutionality of Advertising Restrictions
Under the first prong of the Central Hudson test, tobacco adver-
tisements will receive no protection under the First Amendment unless they
are truthful and promote a legal activity." 8 Although it is legal to smoke
116. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,355 (1995). The FDA proposed rule states: "The agency believes that,
because it could have banned the sale or distribution of the product, or banned certain of the
marketing and promotional practices of the tobacco industry, the lesser steps of regulating labeling
and advertising and requiring manufacturers to fund a government approved educational campaign
are reasonable." Id. (citing Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346).
It should also be noted, however, that the Supreme Court affirmed a district court ruling
that "Congress has the power to prohibit the advertising of cigarettes in any media" pursuant to
its power to regulate interstate commerce. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971), afd mem., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
117. However, even if the reviewing court finds that the FDA does have the power under
the FDCA to ban all promotion and sales of tobacco, it could nevertheless distinguish Posadas
because the case involved a statute passed by a legislature, whereas the FDA proposed rule is
merely a regulation by a federal agency.
118. The FDA-proposed regulations may still violate the First Amendment even though they
permit the plaintiffs to communicate their messages in black and white text. The Supreme Court
has held that "commercial illustrations are entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded
verbal commercial speech: restrictions on the use of visual media of expression in advertising
must survive scrutiny under the Central Hudson test." Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985).
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cigarettes and use smokeless tobacco products, the FDA charges that
tobacco advertisements are misleading and therefore not entitled to First
Amendment protection. Specifically, the FDA argues that cigarette
advertisements depict smokers as young, healthy, active people when the
reality is that cigarette smoking is unhealthful and causes disease and
premature death among long-term users." 9  Moreover, the FDA argues
that tobacco advertisements generally contain little information that is
important or useful to consumers. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
the Supreme Court protected commercial speech because it contained
information that was important, if not essential, to particular con-
sumers. 120  However, tobacco advertisements featuring no more than
images of young, healthy people at play, or a "cool" cartoon camel, lack
any such important or essential information and, coupled with the
misleading nature of the message, should not be entitled to First
Amendment protection.
The tobacco industry may assert that tobacco advertisements are not
false or misleading because they make no statements or implications as to
the health effects of tobacco use. Moreover, Central Hudson, which was
decided after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, did not require that the
commercial speech contain important consumer information to receive First
Amendment protection.' 2' Therefore, because tobacco use is legal and
tobacco advertisements make no false or misleading statements, the speech
119. See supra text accompanying notes 46-58.
120. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
763-64 (1976) (footnote omitted). Justice Blackmun, in the majority opinion, stated:
[T]he particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information...
may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his (or her] interest in the day's most
urgent political debate .... Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price
information hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A
disproportionate amount of their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs; yet
they are the least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where
their scarce dollars are best spent. When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do,
information as to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience. It could
mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.
Id.
121. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562
(1980). On this issue, the Supreme Court stated:
In applying the First Amendment to [commercial speech], we have rejected the
"highly paternalistic" view that government has complete power to suppress or
regulate commercial speech. "[P]eople will perceive their own best interests only
if they are well enough informed, and... the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication, rather than to close them .. " Even when advertising
communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First
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should receive First Amendment protection under the first prong of the
Central Hudson test.
Assuming the first prong of the Central Hudson test is met, the
burden then shifts to the FDA to demonstrate that: (1) its interest in
restricting tobacco promotion is substantial, 22 (2) the proposed rule
would directly advance that interest, 23 and (3) the proposed rule is
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. 24  First, the FDA
would argue that it is a "substantial" governmental interest to prevent
young people from becoming addicted to tobacco products which, over the
long term, cause a multitude of adverse health effects (including lung
cancer, heart disease, and stroke) and 400,000 American deaths every
year.125  In Central Hudson, the Court held that promoting energy
conservation was a "substantial" governmental interest. 126 In Posadas,
the Court held that protecting the citizens of Puerto Rico from the negative
effects of legalized gambling (including crime, prostitution, and corruption)
was a "substantial" governmental interest.' 27 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit
held in Dunagin v. City of Oxford that, without question, the State of
Mississippi had a "substantial" interest in "safeguarding the health, safety
and general welfare of its citizens by controlling the artificial stimulation
of liquor sales and consumption created by the advertising of liquor."'
28
Analogously, the reviewing court should hold that the FDA's interest in
safeguarding the health, safety, and general welfare of America's youth by
reducing their consumption of tobacco products is also a "substantial"
governmental interest. The fact that all fifty states have prohibited the sale
of tobacco products to minors suggests the interest is not only substantial
but unanimous among state governments. Even the tobacco industry has
made repeated public statements that children under age eighteen should be
122. Id. at 564.
123. Id.
124. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
125. See DHHS, Cigarette Sinoking-Attributable Mortality, supra note 1, at 645.
126. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569.
127. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341
(1986).
128. 718 F.2d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1986).
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prohibited from smoking.'29 Therefore, prong two of the Central Hudson
test is satisfied.
Next, the FDA could argue that the regulation "directly advances" the
government interest because it specifically addresses ways to block the
access of tobacco products to young people as well as reduce the
promotional messages that increase their demand to use these products. 3 '
Opponents, however, could argue that the regulation is merely an indirect
way of advancing the government interest and the only direct way is for
the government to enforce the laws now on the books in all fifty states that
prohibit minors from purchasing tobacco products. However, the FDA
could respond that because young people obtain cigarettes from indirect
modes of sale, including vending machines, mail order sales, and cigarette
giveaways, merely enforcing current state purchasing laws will not solve
the problem. Alternatively, the federal government is powerless to enforce
state laws, thus a national minimum purchasing age and federal enforce-
ment program is required. Moreover, it is unrealistic to presume that
government can eliminate all underage tobacco use simply by "enforcing"
the existing underage purchasing laws. Even if all tobacco products were
banned, people, including minors, would find ways to obtain them.
Therefore, the FDA measures designed to reduce the appeal of these
products to young people-including "tombstone" advertising formats and
a national educational program--are also necessary to combat the problem.
However, the FDA need not show that these measures are necessary,
only that they "directly advance" the government interest of reducing
tobacco use among young people. In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
found that because there was an immediate connection between advertising
and demand for electricity, there is a "direct link" between the ban on
129. In a recent advertising campaign, the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company placed full-page
ads in several editions of the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and other major periodicals.
One such advertisement stated: "We all agree we must do something to keep cigarettes out of
the hands of children under the age of eighteen .... A proven solution is to . . . enforce the
existing laws in 50 states denying children access to cigarettes." L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1995, at
A21. A similar ad stated: "Only adults should ever face the decision to smoke or not to
smoke.... As a parent... you need to add your voice to the many others trying to discourage
kids from smoking. [The] R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company offers parents brochures which can
help them talk to their kids about smoking .. " L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at AI7.
Accompanying the brochures sent by R.J. Reynolds is a letter stating: "At R.J. Reynolds we're
committed to doing everything possible to combat underage smoking." Letter from Herbert E.
Osmon, Staff Vice President, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, to parents and concerned citizens
(Sept., 1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
130. See supra part IV.C.2.
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advertising of electricity and the state interest in conservation. 3' Several
other courts have also found that advertising is directly related to the
consumption of the advertised product. 32  Similarly, here, the proposed
restrictions on sales and promotion of tobacco would "directly advance" the
government's interest by decreasing youth demand and access to tobacco
products. Therefore, prong three is satisfied.
The FDA's foremost challenge will be in the fourth prong: Is the
proposed rule narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective? The
opponents to the proposed rule could argue that the rule is not narrowly
tailored because it would ban all tobacco advertisements except those that
the government believes are suited for children. The Supreme Court has
stated that the government may not "reduce the adult population ... to
reading only what is fit for children."'
133
However, the Supreme Court held in Central Hudson that the test is
whether the government's interest could be served as effectively by a more
limited restriction on commercial speech.'34 If not, the fourth prong is
satisfied. Opponents, in their respective complaints, do not address
specifically how the FDA could serve its interests as effectively, but with
a less restrictive policy. Indeed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
conceive of a federal program that would accomplish all that the proposed
rule would accomplish, and yet be less restrictive to tobacco manufacturers,
advertisers, and vendors. If the reviewing court cannot conceive of such
131. 447 U.S. at 569.
132. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F.2d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that
alcohol advertising and alcohol consumption are directly linked), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259
(1984); Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that "an advertisement
encouraging the use of drugs encourages actions which in fact endanger the health or safety of
students"); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 586 (D.D.C. 1971) (noting
a "close relationship between cigarette commercials broadcast on the electronic media and their
potential influence on young people"); Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 433
N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1982) (finding that "[t]he advertising of drink prices and price
advantages would encourage and stimulate excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages; an
advertising prohibition aids the interest in preventing that consumption"), appeal dismissed, 459
U.S. 807 (1982).
133. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983) (quoting Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). However, Bolger and Butler are factually and legally
distinguishable from the FDA proposed rule. Bolger relates to a federal statute banning the
mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. The Supreme Court held the ban
unconstitutional because it related to an activity that is protected from unwarranted governmental
interference. Id. at 69 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-01 (1977)).
Butler is distinguishable because it related to a Michigan state law prohibiting obscene language
from books available to the general reading public. The case did not relate to commercial speech
but focused primarily on the obscenity doctrine. Butler, 352 U.S. at 381-83.
134. Central Hudson. 447 U.S. at 564.
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a feasible program, then it should find the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test is satisfied.
The FDA could also make the following affirmative arguments that
the proposed rule is narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. The
FDA objective is to decrease tobacco use by young people. The proposed
rule would not restrict all advertising but only advertisements that would
be read by young people; advertisements read predominantly by adults are
not affected. Also, the proposed rule would not ban such advertisements
but merely impose restrictions on the advertising, such as prohibiting the
use of color and pictures, which make the advertisements more appealing
to young people. Further, the proposed rule would not affect all tobacco
products but only those products which young people use predominantly:
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. Cigars and tobacco pipes are not subject
to the regulation, in part, because they are not used as predominantly by
young people.'35 Therefore, the proposed rule is narrowly tailored to
achieve the desired objective of reducing tobacco use among young people,
and thus the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied.'36
2. The Constitutionality of Restrictions on
Other Promotional Activities
In addition to restricting tobacco advertisements, the proposed rule
would prohibit the following: brand name sponsorship of sporting events;
the manufacturing and sale of non-tobacco items that feature tobacco brand-
names (such as T-shirts, caps and sporting goods); vending machines, self-
service displays, mail order sales, and mail order redemption of coupon
programs; and all contests, lotteries, and games of chance linked to the
purchase of a tobacco product.'37 Opponents of the proposed rule argue
that these activities are also protected by the First Amendment.
These promotional activities, however, would receive no greater
protection than that afforded to commercial speech because they are either
(1) a form of advertising (banners at a sporting event, a logo on a T-shirt,
etc.); (2) a mode of sale (vending machine, mail order, etc.); or (3) some
other attempt to propose or entice a commercial transaction (contests,
135. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,322 (1995).
136. For comparison, the Fifth Circuit upheld a Mississippi statewide ban on all liquor
advertisements (including newspaper, billboard, circular, radio and television advertisements)
originating within the state. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 751. Applying the Central Hudson test, the
court found the total ban passed the fourth prong because it was "not more extensive than
necessary" to serve the state interest of reducing alcohol consumption. Id.
137. See supra part IV.C.1.
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lotteries, etc.). As such, they are various forms of commercial speech and
are protected by the First Amendment only to the extent that the
government does not have a substantial interest in restricting that speech.
The Central Hudson analysis applies here and, for the reasons herein
discussed, the government is likely to prevail.
3. Application of the Overbreadth Doctrine
The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on unprotected speech
may still be unconstitutional if the restriction is "overbroad" such that it
would "chill" constitutionally protected speech. 3 Opponents of the
proposed rule argue that the overbreadth doctrine applies here because
tobacco manufacturers, advertisers, and vendors would be chilled from
communicating constitutionally protected speech.'39 However, because
the proposed rule only applies to commercial speech, and because
commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment if the Central
Hudson test is satisfied, the overbreadth doctrine does not apply unless
opponents can show that fully protected, non-commercial speech would be
chilled. Because the opponents would be free to communicate any message
in black and white text--only color and pictures would be banned-it is
unlikely that non-commercial speech would be affected by the proposed
rule. The Supreme Court has held that the overbreadth doctrine applies
weakly, or not at all, to commercial speech.4 Therefore, opponents
should not prevail under the overbreadth doctrine.
In addition to possible First Amendment violations, the FDA proposed
rule raises issues of jurisdiction. Specifically, does the FDA have
jurisdiction to promulgate such a rule? And does the United States District
Court have jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the proposed rule before it is
ever promulgated? These issues are discussed in Part VI.
138. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1022-24 (2d ed.
1988).
139. See American Advertising Fed'n, supra note 15, at 15.
140. In Bates, the Supreme Court stated that "[s]ince advertising is linked to commercial
well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by
overbroad regulation." Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
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VI. JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Does the FDA Have Jurisdiction to Regulate
Tobacco Promotion and Sales?
1. FDA's Assertion of Jurisdiction
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") 4' was
enacted to regulate consumer products, including food, drugs, medical
devices, biologics and cosmetics to safeguard the public health and protect
consumer welfare. To achieve this purpose, the FDCA grants the Secretary
of Health and Human Services the authority to "promulgate regulations for
the efficient enforcement of [the FDCA].' 42  Additionally, the FDCA
authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations restricting the sale, distribution,
or use of a drug delivery "device."'
' 43
The FDA, acting under authority delegated by the Secretary,' 4 has
determined that nicotine conforms with the definition of a "drug" and
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products conform with the definition of
a drug delivery "device" under the FDCA. A "drug," as defined by the
FDCA, is an article, other than food, "intended to affect ... any function
of the body."'' 45 Similarly, a "device" is an instrument or other similar
article "intended to affect ... any function of the body."'
' 46
According to the FDA, nicotine is a "drug" within the meaning of the
FDCA because it is "highly addictive, causes other psychoactive effects,
such as relaxation and stimulation, and affects weight regulation."'' 47 The
FDA cites several medical authorities to support its conclusion that nicotine
is an addictive drug. First, the United States Surgeon General reported in
141. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994).
142. Id. § 371(a).
143. Id. § 360j(e)(l).
144. 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a) (1995) (granting to the Commissioner of the FDA the authority to
act on matters falling under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95
(1994))).
145. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994).
146. Id. § 321(h)(3).
147. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,464 (1995). The FDA notes that "[t]he quantity, quality and scope of
the evidence available to FDA today is far greater than any other time when FDA has considered
regulation of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products." Id. at 41,464 n. I. The FDA makes this
statement, in part, to refute statements by previous FDA officials that the FDA is without
jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes as drugs or devices. See infra note 162.
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1986 and 1988 that nicotine in smokeless tobacco products and cigarettes
causes addiction. 48  Second, several major studies show that eighty to
ninety percent of frequent smokers are addicted to cigarettes. 149  Third,
since 1980, nicotine has been recognized as addictive by seven major
national and international health organizations. 50
The FDA reasons that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are
"devices" within the meaning of the FDCA because they deliver doses of
the drug, nicotine, into the human body and are therefore "instruments...
intended to affect ... any function of the body."'
5'1
To assert jurisdiction, the FDA must also establish that tobacco
manufacturers objectively intend nicotine to affect a function of the human
body. 52 The FDA argues that manufacturers have this objective intent.
First, it is widely known and published in scientific, government and lay
publications that nicotine is addictive. 153  Second, over the past thirty
years, tobacco manufacturers themselves have engaged in more than 600
research studies on nicotine's psychoactive and addictive effects." 4
Third, industry officials have made repeated statements acknowledging or
implying that nicotine is addictive. 15  Fourth, tobacco manufacturers
148. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. 86-2874, THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF USING SMOKELESS TOBACCO, A REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO
THE SURGEON GENERAL 182 (1986); DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. NO. 88-
9406, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 215 (1988) [hereinafter SGR 1988].
149. According to the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), 87% of people who smoke
cigarettes smoke every day. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,547 (1995) (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
1991 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, Atlanta, GA (1991)). Further, the CDC has
reported that each year in the U.S. fifteen million people (one third of all U.S. smokers) try to
quit smoking, but less than three percent have long-term success, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,547-48 (citing
DHHS, Cigarette Smoking Among Adults, supra note 3). Also, 70% of current smokers reported
that they would "like to completely stop smoking" but cannot. Id. Moreover, a Department of
Health and Human Services survey found that 83% to 87% percent of cigarette smokers who
smoke more than 26 cigarettes a day believe they are addicted. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,487 (1995)
(citing DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 1991/1992 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON
DRUG ABUSE).
150. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,484 (1995). These include the World Health Organization, the
American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological
Association, the American Society of Addiction Medicine, the Royal Society of Canada, and the
Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom. Id.
151. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3) (1994).
152. See generally 60 Fed. Reg. 41,471-82 (1995).
153. See generally 60 Fed. Reg. 41,539-46 (1995).
154. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,625-43 (1995) (listing these studies).
155. The FDA cites several statements made by tobacco industry officials acknowledging
or implying that nicotine in tobacco is addictive. A small sampling of these statements includes
the following. In a 1963 internal memorandum, the general counsel to Brown & Williamson
CURTAINS FOR JOE CAMEL?
intentionally manipulate the nicotine levels in cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products to ensure continued addiction by consumers.
1 56
Therefore, the FDA argues, because tobacco companies manufacture
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products knowing the addictive and other
psychoactive effects of nicotine, they objectively intend to affect the
function of the human body by selling their products.
Moreover, the jurisdictional analysis asserts that the FDA has broad
authority over the definition of whether a product is a drug or a device.
157
To support this position, the FDA cites Weinberger v. Bentex Phar-
maceuticals, in which the Supreme Court held that the "FDA has
jurisdiction to decide with administrative finality, subject to the types of
judicial review provided [in the FDCA], the ... status of individual drugs
or classes of drugs."' 5 8 Therefore, the FDA concludes, it has authority
to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products as drug delivery
devices.
2. Arguments Opposing Jurisdiction
Opponents of the proposed rule-consisting of tobacco manufacturers,
advertising firms, smokeless tobacto companies, and convenience
stores-contend that the FDA lacks jurisdiction to promulgate a rule on this
issue. Primarily they argue that Congress has, in both its words and
actions, indicated clearly and unambiguously that the FDA should not have
jurisdiction over cigarette labeling, promotion, or sales. First, Congress has
repeatedly acted in the area of labeling and advertising of tobacco products
and has never delegated power to the FDA, though it has delegated power
Tobacco Co. stated: "Moreover, nicotine is addictive .... We are, then, in the business of
selling nicotine, an addictive drug .. " 60 Fed. Reg. 41,611 (1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Memorandum from A. Yeaman, Implications of Battelle Hippo I and II and the Griffith Filter,
July 17, 1963, at 4).
Also, F. Ross Johnson, former CEO of RJR Nabisco, has openly acknowledged that
tobacco is addictive and that its addictive properties are why people smoke. In an interview with
the Wall Street Journal, Mr. Johnson was asked about tobacco. He responded: "Of course it's
addictive. That's why you smoke ...." Eben Shapiro, Big Spender Finds a New Place to
Spend, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1994, at B 1.
Further, William L. Dunn, Jr. of Philip Morris characterized the cigarette as a nicotine
delivery system when he wrote: "Think of the cigarette pack as a storage container for a day's
supply of nicotine .... Think of the cigarette as a dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine . ...
Think of a puff of smoke as the vehicle of nicotine .... 60 Fed. Reg. 41,617 (1995) (quoting
William L. Dunn, Motives and Incentives in Cigarette Smoking, Summary of CTR-Sponsored
Conference in St. Martin, Philip Morris Research Center, VA (1972)).
156. See generally 60 Fed. Reg. 41,693-749 (1995).
157. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,463 (1995).
158. 412 U.S. 645, 653 (1973).
19963
426 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
to other agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the
FCC.
159
Second, opponents note that Congress has repeatedly considered and
rejected the specific tobacco advertising proposals contained in the FDA's
proposed restrictions. Specifically, Congress considered legislation in 1987,
1989, 1990, and 1993, that contained many of the same provisions as the
1995 FDA proposed rule, including giving the FDA jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco sales and advertising. 6 ° However, because the legislation was
never enacted, opponents contend, the proposed rule directly contradicts the
will of Congress not to give the FDA jurisdiction in this area.6
Third, opponents cite specific statements made by previous FDA
officials to the effect that, without express Congressional delegation of
authority, the FDA does not have jurisdiction to regulate the labeling,
promotion, or sale of tobacco products.'62 However, these statements do
not preclude the FDA from re-evaluating the issue and reaching a different
conclusion. 63
159. See infra part VI.A.4.
160. See supra part lI.B.
161. See American Advertising Fed'n, supra note 15, at 11.
162. See Coyne Beahm, supra note 14, at 14-17. Opponents cite several statements by FDA
officials. For example, in 1972, FDA Commissioner Charles Edwards, M.D. stated that
"cigarettes recommended for smoking pleasure are beyond the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act." Id. at 15 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Amendments of 1971. Hearings on S. 1454
Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 239
(1972)).
Also in 1972, FDA Chief Counsel Peter Barton Hutt stated in a letter to Congress: "The
Public Health and Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does not allow FDA either to require additional
warning statements on the label or to ban cigarettes from interstate commerce." Id. at 16.
In 1980, the FDA filed a brief with the United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit which
stated:
In the 73 years since the enactment of the original [FDCA] and in the 41 years
since the promulgation of the modem [FDCA], the FDA has repeatedly informed
Congress that cigarettes are beyond the scope of the statute absent health claims
establishing a therapeutic intent on behalf of the manufacturer or vendor.
See Coyne Beahm, supra note 14, at 17 (quoting Brief for Appellee (FDA) at 14-15, Action on
Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (No. 79-1397)).
163. The FDA has reconsidered the issue in light of new studies conducted in the last 15
years which show that nicotine causes chemical addiction in people. It was not until 1986 and
1988 that the U.S. Surgeon General published findings that nicotine in smokeless tobacco and
cigarettes are addicting, that nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction, and that the
pharmacological and behavioral processes that cause tobacco addiction are similar to those that
cause addiction to drugs such as heroin and cocaine. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,541-43 (1995) (citing SGR
1988, supra note 148).
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3. Standard of Review: The Chevron Test
In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,'
1"
the Supreme Court set forth a two part analysis for reviewing an agency's
interpretation of a statute. First, "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 161 However,
the second part states that if "Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue," the reviewing court must give effect to the
agency's interpretation if that interpretation is "reasonable."'' 66  The
Chevron test is important to an analysis of the FDA proposed rule for
obvious reasons. If the reviewing court finds that Congress has not clearly
intended to preclude the FDA from regulating in the area of tobacco sales
and promotion, then the reviewing court must give effect to the FDA's
assertion of jurisdiction, if the FDA's statutory interpretation is
"reasonable." 167
164. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
165. Id. at 842-43.
166. Id. at 843-44. It should be noted that the facts in Chevron involved the dissemination
and interpretation of complex scientific data concerning air pollution emissions. The Supreme
Court gave substantial deference to the federal agency (the Environmental Protection Agency)
because these issues fell within the expertise of the agency and the Court felt it was inappropriate
to second-guess the technical findings of the agency. Id. at 865. Opponents of the FDA
proposed rule could argue that Chevron does not apply because the issues relating to tobacco use
do not present equally complex scientific issues. The FDA, however, could counter that the issue
of whether nicotine should be classified as a "drug" involves complex scientific data on the
chemical and physiological affects of nicotine on the human body. As such, Chevron does apply
and compels the district court to defer to the FDA's reasonable interpretation.
167. Two additional Supreme Court cases interpreting the Chevron test are also important
in analyzing this issue. First, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, a five-justice majority reversed an INS
interpretation of a federal statute, holding that the interpretation was inconsistent with the "plain
language of the Act." 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987). The majority concluded that if the question is
one purely of statutory construction, absent facts specific to the case, the reviewing court may
interpret the statute under Chevron's step one. Id. at 446-48.
However, in NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, the Court unanimously
retracted dicta from Cardoza-Fonseca that was inconsistent with Chevron, and reaffirmed the
Chevron policy of giving substantial deference to the agency. 484 U.S. 112 (1987). The Court
in United Food held that Congress had not resolved the issue in dispute, and thus the agency's
reasonable construction must be affirmed under Chevron's step two. Id. at 125, 133.
See also KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 124-
26, 130-31 (3d ed. 1994).
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4. Congressional Intent and Preemption
Under Chevron, the reviewing court must first determine whether "the
intent of Congress is clear" on the issue of whether the FDCA gives the
FDA the power to regulate nicotine as a drug. Congress has never formally
stated whether nicotine is a drug under the FDCA; nor has Congress ever
expressly stated whether the FDA has jurisdiction over tobacco products or
nicotine. However, Congress has enacted statutes regulating the promotion
of tobacco products, including the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1965 ("the Cigarette Act"), 6 ' and the Comprehensive
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 ("the Smokeless
Act"). 169 The Cigarette Act states:
It is the policy of Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to
establish a comprehensive Federal Program to deal with
cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relation-
ship between smoking and health, whereby--( 1) the public may
be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of
cigarette smoking ... and (2) commerce and the national
economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent
with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking
and health. 7
The Cigarette Act grants the FTC the power to promulgate regulations
consistent with the provisions of the Cigarette Act.' 71 Moreover, in 1970,
an amendment to the Cigarette Act banned all cigarette advertisements from
television, radio, and other electronic media within the jurisdiction of the
FCC. 7 2 Congress granted the FCC jurisdiction over the amendment.
73
Opponents of the FDA proposed rule argue that Congress clearly
intended the Cigarette Act to constitute the "comprehensive" federal law
with respect to the labeling and advertising of cigarettes.'74 Therefore,
168. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994).
169. Id. §§ 4401-08.
170. Id. § 1331 (emphasis added).
171. Id. § 1333(c)(1), (c)(2)(A).
172. Id. § 1335.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994). Though no express statement is made here to this effect, it
can be implied that the FCC has such power because the advertising ban is within "the
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission." Id.
174. See Coyne Beahm, supra note 14, at 8-9.
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with the exception of the FTC and FCC, all other federal agencies lack
authority to act in this area.
The Smokeless Act mirrors the Cigarette Act in that it appears to set
forth a comprehensive national policy with respect to the labeling and
advertising of smokeless tobacco products. Specifically, the Smokeless Act
empowers the Secretary of Health and Human Services to "carry out a
program to inform the public of any dangers to human health resulting
from the use of smokeless tobacco products.', 75 The Smokeless Act also
empowers the Secretary to "make grants to States-(1) to assist in the
development of educational programs and materials and public service
announcements ... (2) to assist in the distribution of such programs,
materials, and announcements throughout the States, and (3) to establish 18
as the minimum age for the purchase of smokeless tobacco."'76
The Smokeless Act also requires manufacturers of smokeless tobacco
products to affix one of three warning labels (similar to the warning labels
required on packages of cigarettes by 15 U.S.C. § 1333) upon all packages
of smokeless tobacco products. 177 One of the three warnings is also
required on all advertisements, other than outdoor billboard advertisements,
for smokeless tobacco products. 7  The Smokeless Act further bans the
advertising of smokeless tobacco products from television, radio and all
other electronic media subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC.'79 Congress
expressly delegated power to the FTC and FCC to take administrative
actions consistent with, and for the enforcement of, the Smokeless Act. 180
Opponents of the FDA proposed rule argue that Congress clearly
intended for the Smokeless Act to serve as the comprehensive federal law
on labeling and advertising of smokeless tobacco products (just as the
Cigarette Act is the comprehensive federal law on the labeling and
advertising of cigarettes). Therefore, with the exception of the FTC and
FCC, all other federal agencies lack authority to act in this area.
Contrarily, the FDA argues that Congress has not precluded FDA
jurisdiction in this area because (1) Congress has never expressly precluded
FDA jurisdiction, and (2) when Congress had the opportunity to preclude
FDA jurisdiction-in the preemption clauses of the Cigarette Act and the
175. 15 U.S.C. § 4401 (1994).
176. Id.
177. Id. § 4402. See supra note 25 (text of the three warning labels).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 4402(a)(2) (1994).
179. Id. § 4402(f).
180. Id. § 4402(b), (f).
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Smokeless Act-it declined to do so. 8' The FDA argues that it is only
preempted with respect to a "statement relating to smoking and health" that
is placed on a "cigarette package"' 82 or a statement placed on "any
package or in any advertisement ... of a smokeless tobacco product."'
83
Otherwise, the FDA is free to regulate the promotion and sales of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco products in other ways-within its jurisdiction under
the FDCA.
5. Analysis: The Chevron Test Applied
Two issues must be resolved before the reviewing court can conclude
that the FDA has jurisdiction to promulgate the regulations in the proposed
rule. First, Congress must not have intended to preclude FDA jurisdiction
in the area of tobacco promotion and sales. Second, the FDA must have
the statutory authority, under the FDCA, to promulgate the regulations in
the proposed rule.
Both of these issues require the application of the two prong analysis
in Chevron. Under Chevron, the first question is whether Congress has
clearly intended to preclude FDA jurisdiction in this area.' If the intent
is clear, that ends the analysis. If it is not, the court must defer to the
FDA's reasonable interpretation that its jurisdiction has not been precluded.
181. The preemption clause of the Cigarette Act provides:
Section 1334. Preemption
(a) Additional Statements
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by
section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) State regulations
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the preemption clause of the Smokeless Act provides:
Section 4406. Preemption
(a) Federal action. No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products
and health, other than the statements required by section 3, shall be required by any
Federal agency to appear on any package or in any advertisement ... of a
smokeless tobacco product.
(b) State and local action. No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco
products and health, other than the statements required by section 3, shall be
required by any State or local statute or regulation to be included on any package
or in any advertisement ... of a smokeless tobacco product.
Id. § 4406 (emphasis added).
182. Id. § 1334.
183. Id. § 4406.
184. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
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As previously stated, opponents to the proposed rule argue that the FDA
is without jurisdiction because (1) Congress has never delegated specific
authority on this issue to the FDA, (2) Congress rejected legislation
containing the same or similar regulations, and (3) previous FDA officials
have stated that the FDA lacks jurisdiction in this area. However, none of
these points is dispositive on the issue of congressional intent. Particularly,
Congress' decision to abstain from action is not, itself, a definitive
statement of congressional intent.
More persuasive is the fact that Congress had the opportunity to
preclude the jurisdiction of federal agencies, other than the FTC and FCC,
when crafting the preemption clauses of the Cigarette Act and Smokeless
Act. However, Congress declined to do so, presenting a genuine ambiguity
as to whether Congress intended to preclude FDA action in the area of
labeling and advertising of tobacco products. Therefore, the reviewing
court must consider prong two of Chevron and determine whether the
FDA's interpretations of the Cigarette Act and Smokeless Act are
"reasonable."'' 85 The FDA has interpreted these Acts to mean that FDA
jurisdiction is not precluded. 186  This interpretation seems "reasonable"
because had Congress wished to preclude the jurisdiction of the FDA, or
other federal agencies, it would have done so in the preemption clause.
Therefore, the reviewing court should hold that the FDA is not precluded
from regulating in the area of tobacco promotion and sales.
However, just because the FDA is not precluded from acting in this
area does not mean the FDA has the statutory authority to do so. Next, the
reviewing court must determine whether the FDCA authorizes the FDA to
regulate nicotine as a drug, and tobacco products as drug delivery devices.
Again, under Chevron, the reviewing court must first determine whether
Congressional intent is clear on this issue. 8 7 Because the FDCA makes
no mention of tobacco or nicotine regulation by the FDA, Congressional
intent is not clear.
88
185. Id. at 843-44.
186. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,353 (1995).
187. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
188. The facts here are analogous to the facts in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990). In LTV, the Supreme Court noted that Congress had authorized the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation ("PBGC") to take over the assets and liabilities of an
insolvent pension plan, created under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(29 U.S.C. § 1347 (1995)). The PBGC adopted a policy whereby it restored plan liabilities
whenever a firm created a "follow on" plan-an action that Congress had never explicitly
authorized. LTV, 496 U.S. at 637, 648-49. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the district
court need only determine whether there is "any clear congressional desire to avoid" such action
by the PBGC. Id. at 648 (emphasis added). If not, the district court must defer to the agency's
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Second, the reviewing court must determine whether the FDA's
interpretation of the FDCA is "reasonable." Because the issue involves
technically complex matters within the agency's expertise, the reviewing
court must give substantial deference to the FDA.'89 Applying the facts
to the FDCA definitions of "drug" and "device," it seems reasonable to
conclude that nicotine is a "drug" because it causes addiction and other
psychoactive effects.19°  Thus, it affects "any function of the body."''
Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products are "devices" because they are used to deliver the drug,
nicotine, into the body and are therefore "instrument[s] ... intended to
affect ... any function of the body."' 92  Therefore, the FDA's
interpretation is "reasonable" and the reviewing court should conclude that
the FDA has the statutory authority to promulgate the proposed regulations.
reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Analogously, Congress has expressly authorized the FDA to regulate drugs and devices,
but has not explicitly authorized the FDA to regulate nicotine as a drug, or tobacco products as
delivery devices. However, under the reasoning in LTV, the reviewing court must only determine
whether Congress clearly intended to avoid such action by the FDA. If not, the reviewing court
must defer to the FDA's reasonable interpretation of the FDCA. Because Congress has not
spoken on this issue, it has shown no clear intent to preclude such FDA action. Therefore, the
reviewing court must defer to the FDA's "reasonable" interpretation of the FDCA.
189. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. The Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Administrator's interpretation . . . is entitled to deference: the regulatory
scheme is technical and complex [and] the agency considered the matter in a
detailed and reasoned fashion .... Judges are not experts in the field, and are not
part of either political branch of the Government .... [A]n agency to which
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy
to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices .... [Flederal judges-who have no
constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
do.
Id.
Moreover, on the issue of judicial deference to the FDA regarding the classification of a
substance as a "new drug" under the definition in the FDCA, the Supreme Court stated:
We think that it is implicit in the regulatory scheme... that FDA has jurisdiction
to decide with administrative finality, subject to the types of judicial review
provided, the "new drug" status of individual drugs or classes of drugs.... Clearly,
if the FDA were required to litigate, on a case-by-case basis, the "new drug" status
of each drug now marketed, the regulatory scheme of the Act would be severely
undermined, if not totally destroyed.... Threshold questions within the peculiar
expertise of an administrative agency are appropriately routed to the agency, while
the court stays its hand.
Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1973) (emphasis added).
190. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
191. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994).
192. Id. § 321(h)(3).
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B. Does the United States District Court Have
Jurisdiction over the Pending Actions?
A second jurisdictional issue is whether the reviewing court has
jurisdiction to hear the actions challenging the FDA proposed rule. Federal
courts generally do not hear challenges to agency actions unless the agency
action is "final," the case is "ripe," and the plaintiff has exhausted all
available administrative remedies.
193
1. Final Agency Action
The Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") gives jurisdiction to
federal courts only over a "final agency action."' 94  According to the
Supreme Court, an "agency action" includes any "agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy."' 95  Furthermore, the Court has
noted that "finality" exists when "regulations have the force of law" or
when they are promulgated by an agency "and the expected conformity to
them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity."96
Applied to the challenges to the proposed rule, the FDA has taken two
actions. First, the FDA has declared that it has jurisdiction to regulate the
promotion and sales of tobacco products pursuant to its statutory authority
under the FDCA. Second, the FDA has proposed a number of regulations
to restrict the promotion and sales of tobacco in order to protect children
and adolescents. Both of these actions are agency actions because they are
"designed to implement . . . or prescribe law or policy."' 197 For an action
to be reviewable, however, it must be "final."' 98  A separate analysis
must be made for each.
In determining whether an agency action is "final" and "fit for judicial
review," the Supreme Court has considered whether: (1) the action was
193. See generally DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 167, at 307-15, 360-71. It should be noted
that ripeness and exhaustion are not jurisdictional issues but discretionary doctrines which allow
a United States district court to dismiss an action, or otherwise refrain from hearing the merits,
until the case is ripe and the administrative remedies have been exhausted. See infra parts
VI.B.2-3.
194. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
195. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)).
196. Id. at 150 (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418-19
(1942)).
197. Id. at 149 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)).
198. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
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definitive; (2) the action had a direct practical effect on the plaintiff; (3) the
question at issue is fit for judicial resolution; and (4) immediate judicial
review would foster agency and judicial efficiency.199
Under the four part Standard Oil test, the specific regulations in the
FDA proposed rule should not be held a final agency action for the
following reasons. First, the proposed rule is not "definitive" because it
does no more than present a proposal that may or may not be promulgated
and enforced as written. Second, the proposed rule is not "fit" for judicial
review because no rule has been made and the reviewing court would only
waste its time adjudicating a proposed rule that may never be promulgated
as written, or at all. Third, immediate judicial review of the proposed rule
would not likely foster agency or judicial efficiency. The FDA should have
an opportunity to review written comments and amend the proposed rule;
a reviewing court's intervention would only interfere with this process.
Also, it would not be efficient for the court to address the issues only to
have the FDA amend the proposal, thus forcing the court to re-adjudicate
these issues after the final rule is promulgated.
However, the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction should be held to be a
final agency action, under the Standard Oil test, for the following reasons.
First, the assertion of jurisdiction appears to be "definitive" because the
FDA has made a conclusive statement that it has the authority to regulate
tobacco products as drug delivery devices.200 Given the definitiveness of
the FDA's statement, it does not appear likely that the FDA will change its
mind after reviewing written comments from opponents and decide that it
has no jurisdiction. Second, the assertion of jurisdiction (and the specific
regulations in the proposed rule) have already had, and will continue to
have, a "direct practical effect" upon the plaintiffs. Specifically, tobacco
manufacturers, advertisers, and vendors claim that they have been forced
to make adjustments for likely major disruptions in tobacco sales and
advertising revenues as a result of the FDA's proposed rule.2 ' Third, the
assertion of jurisdiction is "fit" for judicial review because the FDA has
already asserted jurisdiction--nothing will make the jurisdictional issue any
more fit for review. Fourth, immediate judicial review of the FDA's
199. FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1980). See Flue-Cured
Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 857 F. Supp. 1137 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (applying the
four part test in Standard Oil). See also discussion infra part VIII.B.
200. The FDA states: "The agency's comprehensive investigation and legal analysis support
a finding at this time that cigarettes, cigarette tobacco, and smokeless tobacco are subject to
regulation on the basis of their nicotine content and intended use .... FDA may, in its
discretion, regulate them using the [FDCA's] device provisions." 60 Fed. Reg. 41,351 (1995).
201. See American Advertising Fed'n, supra note 15, at 11-12.
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assertion of jurisdiction is likely to foster agency and judicial efficiency.
If the reviewing court concludes, at the outset, that the FDA has no
jurisdiction to regulate in this area, both the reviewing court and the agency
would avoid an unnecessary expenditure of time, money and effort to
litigate the legality of each proposed regulation.
Therefore, under the Standard Oil test, the reviewing court should
hear the challenges to the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction but should refrain
from hearing the merits of the legality of each proposed regulation until the
FDA has promulgated a final rule.
2. Ripeness
The ripeness doctrine authorizes a federal court to abstain from
hearing a case if it is not yet fit for judicial review. In Abbott
Laboratories,2 2 the Supreme Court stated the rationale behind the
ripeness requirement and established a two prong test for determining
ripeness.
[T]he ripeness doctrine ... is to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves
in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also
to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt
in a concrete way by the challenging parties. The problem is
best seen in a two fold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration. °3
As applied here, the two prong test of Abbott Laboratories shows that the
proposed rule is not yet fit for judicial review because it is just that, a
proposal. Until the FDA has had an opportunity to review all written
comments, make any appropriate changes, and promulgate a final rule in
accordance with these changes, the case will not be fit for judicial review.
However, the court must consider the hardship to the parties in withholding
court consideration. On the one hand, if the reviewing court determines
that the FDA will likely promulgate a final rule very similar to the
proposed rule, immediate review would save time and money for both the
FDA and the companies challenging the proposed rule.
If the rule is upheld, its enforcement thereafter can be swift,
efficient, and inexpensive. Moreover, the agency is then in a
202. Abbot Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
203. Id. at 148-49.
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position to build the rest of its regulatory ... policies around the
rule. Even if the rule is reversed, the agency benefits from
prompt resolution of the issue. The agency then can begin
immediately to pursue an alternative means of performing its
statutory missions.2 4
Also, the tobacco manufacturers, advertisers and vendors challenging the
FDA action claim that they have suffered and will continue to suffer
hardship resulting from the issuance of the proposed rule. Specifically, the
billions of dollars spent annually on tobacco promotion and advertising,2" 5
and the many more billions in tobacco product sales revenue, hang in the
balance of the determination of whether the FDA has jurisdiction and
whether the regulations are legally sound. As a result, long-term business
planning is severely disrupted by the likely impacts of the proposed rule on
tobacco-related industries.
Because ripeness is a discretionary doctrine, the reviewing court may
apply the Abbott Laboratories test as it sees fit, and it has full discretion
on whether the merits of the case should be heard. It seems apparent from
the facts, however, that reviewing the challenges to each provision of the
proposed rule would be premature if done prior to the FDA's promulgation
of a final rule.
3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A second, and related, discretionary doctrine is that of exhaustion.
Federal courts generally require a plaintiff to exhaust all remedies available
in the administrative agency before bringing suit in federal court. In Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,206 the Supreme Court stated unequivo-
cally: "[It is] the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is
entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted., '20 ' The FDA
204. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 167, at 376. Davis & Pierce also note that "practical
concerns" exist when opponents of a rule seek review in court before the rule is ever enforced
because this allows the challenger "to frustrate an agency's pursuit of its goals for a protracted
period of time by seeking review .. . in the district court most sympathetic to the petitioner's
views." Id. With notable prescience, Davis & Pierce state:
If, for instance, the rule adversely affects the tobacco industry, the industry might
seek review in a district court located in the heart of the tobacco growing region.
As a result, a single district judge, perhaps with aberrational views on the issue,
could delay significantly an agency's pursuit of a major national goal.
Id.
205, See supra text accompanying note 39.
206. 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
207. Id. at 50-51. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 167, at 307.
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proposed rule provides that interested parties may provide the FDA with
written comments that will be taken into consideration when the agency
crafts the final rule. Because the plaintiffs brought suit prior to the
promulgation of a final rule, they have not exhausted the administrative
procedures required of a formal rulemaking--specifically, the notice and
comment period, an opportunity for the agency to respond to comments,
and the promulgation of a final rule. However, if the reviewing court
determines that the case should be heard before a final rule is promulgated,
due to either likely hardship on the parties or other factors weighing in
favor of immediate review, the court may waive the exhaustion re-
quirement.
This Comment has discussed the constitutional and jurisdictional
considerations relating to the proposed regulations on the advertising,
promotion, and sales of tobacco products. However, a separate analysis
must be conducted to determine the legality of the proposed national
educational program, funded by tobacco manufacturers.'"
VII. LEGALITY OF THE EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN FUND
The question to be resolved is whether the FDA has the authority to
require manufacturers to pay into a $150 million educational fund for the
purpose of financing anti-tobacco advertisements directed at young people.
The FDA notes that a similar program was implemented by the FCC
between July 1967 and December 1970.2 Under the program, the FCC
required broadcasters to run anti-smoking messages on television and radio
in response to industry-sponsored, pro-smoking advertisements in these
media.210 The FCC based its authority for the program on the "Fairness
Doctrine." '' During the FCC program, one anti-smoking message
appeared for every three or four industry-sponsored, pro-smoking
advertisements, amounting to approximately $75 million (in 1970 dollars)
in commercial air time for anti-smoking messages annually.212  On
208. An outline of the proposed educational program is presented supra part IV.C.2.
209. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,326-27 (1995).
210. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,327 (1995).
211. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,326-27 (1995). The "Fairness Doctrine" required that broadcast media
licensees provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on the
coverage of important controversial issues. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654,
655 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding FCC's repeal of the "Fairness Doctrine").
212. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,327 (1995).
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January 1, 1971 all tobacco advertisements were banned from television
and radio, 1 3 thus ending the FCC's "counterspeech" program.
2 14
The FDA cannot claim the same authority for its educational program
because the Fairness Doctrine has been repealed."1 5 Therefore, the FDA
must claim authority under the FDCA--specifically, under the FDA's
power to regulate all labeling and advertising of drugs and drug delivery
devices.21 6 However, regulating labeling and advertising of drugs and
delivery devices is a far cry from requiring manufacturers of a drug or
delivery device to contribute to a fund for the purpose of buying adver-
tisements to dissuade the public from using that drug or delivery device.
Congress has not authorized the FDA to take such action either in the
FDCA or any other federal statute. Without clear statutory authority, the
reviewing court should hold that the FDA is without authority to create the
educational campaign fund.
VIII. THE BACKGROUND OF JUDGE OSTEEN
A full analysis of the issue requires examination of the record of the
judge assigned to the cases challenging the proposed rule. United States
District Judge William L. Osteen, Sr., who will hear the four cases brought
by tobacco manufacturers, advertisers and vendors,2"7 has a history on
tobacco issues that may provide some insight on how he will approach the
litigation.
A. Past Lobbying Activity
In 1974, William Osteen, as a private attorney, was hired by an
organization of North Carolina tobacco growers to lobby the Secretary of
Agriculture in Washington, D.C., to save a federal tobacco production
quota program slated for elimination." 8  Osteen was successful in
keeping the quota program alive." 9 However, prior to his appointment
to the bench, Osteen was a private attorney for more than twenty years in
North Carolina, a major tobacco producing and manufacturing state.
Because this one instance was Osteen's only representation of a tobacco
213. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
214. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,327 (1995).
215. See Syracuse, 867 F.2d at 655.
216. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,350 (1995).
217. For a list of the plaintiffs, see supra notes 14-17.
218. Judge Once Worked as Tobacco Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1995, at D3.
219. Scott Solomo, Judge's Past Poses No Conflict, Observers Say, NEWS & REC., Aug. 19,
1995, at BI.
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company or organization, it does not necessarily indicate a bias in favor of
the tobacco industry.
B. The Flue-Cured Tobacco Decision
In June 1995, Judge Osteen entered a preliminary ruling in Flue-
Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization, Corp. v. United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency.220  The case, currently pending in Judge
Osteen's court, involves a challenge by tobacco manufacturers to the
Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") determination that second-
hand smoke (technically referred to as "environmental tobacco smoke" or
"ETS") is a known human carcinogen. The EPA moved to dismiss the
case, arguing that its determination was not an "agency action," as defined
by the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore the court had no
jurisdiction to hear the challenge. 2
In his memorandum opinion, Judge Osteen held that the issuance of
the report and classification constituted an "agency action" because (1) the
EPA was required by statute to issue such a report; (2) the issuance of the
report had completed a notice and comment process (similar to a
rulemaking); and (3) the report and classification had an indirect regulatory
effect by leading the United States Postmaster General and the General
Services Administration to independently institute regulations within their
departments on second-hand smoke.222
Applying the four part test from Standard Oil,223 Judge Osteen also
found that the agency action was "final" because (1) it classified ETS as
a known human carcinogen and was therefore "definitive;" (2) it had a
direct practical effect on the plaintiffs, given the actions by the Postmaster
General and GSA; (3) the questions at issue were "fit" for judicial
resolution; and (4) immediate judicial review would foster agency and
judicial efficiency.
2 24
220. 857 F. Supp. 1137 (M.D.N.C. 1994). Additional plaintiffs include: The Council for
Burley Tobacco, Inc.; Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc.; Philip Morris Inc.; R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.; and Gallins Vending Co.
Judge Osteen was assigned the four actions challenging the FDA proposed rule by the
middle district's court clerk, J.P. Creekmore, for reasons of judicial economy--both the Flue-
Cured Tobacco case and the four FDA challenges involve government regulation of tobacco.
Harvey Berkman, Question of Judicial Bias Raised, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 28, 1995, at A2 1.
221. Flue-Cured Tobacco, 857 F. Supp. at 1139.
222. Id. at 1141-42.
223. See supra part VI.B. 1.
224. Flue-Cured Tobacco, 857 F. Supp. at 1143-44.
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The preliminary ruling in Flue-Cured Tobacco may be helpful in
predicting how Judge Osteen might rule on the reviewability of the FDA's
proposed rule and assertion of jurisdiction prior to the promulgation of a
final rule. Part VI.B. 1 of this Comment applies the four part Standard Oil
test to the FDA proposed rule and assertion of jurisdiction in the same way
Judge Osteen applied the Standard Oil test in Flue-Cured Tobacco. Judge
Osteen is likely to conclude that the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction is a
"final agency action" and therefore immediately reviewable. However, the
specific proposed regulations will not be "final" and thus not reviewable
until a final rule has been promulgated.
C. Other Commentary on Judge Osteen
Some anti-tobacco activists are speculating that due to Judge Osteen's
past history and recent decision in Flue-Cured Tobacco, he will not give
the issue a fair hearing. John Banzhaf, an attorney and executive director
of Action on Smoking and Health in Washington, D.C., was quoted as
saying that the tobacco companies "chose from all the federal judges the
single federal judge most likely to be sympathetic to their point of
view., 225 Also, Richard A. Daynard, chairman of the Tobacco Products
Liability Project at Northeastern University School of Law in Boston, was
quoted as saying, "I think the [tobacco] industry expects to have a series
of favorable preliminary rulings, and at the very least, as much delay as
they can possibly get ... [a]mong Southern lawyers it's called home
cooking, helping out the friends and neighbors." '226
D. Analysis
Despite the above statements, there is little evidence to suggest that
Judge Osteen will not give the matter a fair hearing. First, the preliminary
ruling in Flue-Cured Tobacco appears to be a fair analysis of the facts
applied to his reasonable interpretation of administrative law. Judge Osteen
seemed to show no outward sympathies favoring one side over another.
Second, news reports indicate that the judge is a non-smoker.227 Third,
the FDA has not filed a motion objecting to Judge Osteen's assignment to
the case or requesting the judge to recuse himself from the case. Perhaps
the FDA does not question the judge's fairness or the FDA may suspect
225. Solomo, supra note 219.
226. Glenn Collins, Judge Who Ruled Pro-Tobacco Named to Hear Companies' Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at DI.
227. Berkman, supra note 220.
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such a motion would fail and does not want to risk offending the judge, or
it hopes to avoid other judges in the Middle District of North Carolina who
may be entirely unsympathetic to the FDA's position.
IX. CONCLUSION
The FDA proposed rule addresses one of the largest preventable
health problems in the United States. Despite the fact that every state
prohibits young people from using tobacco products, four million people
under the age of eighteen use these products.228 Statistics indicate that
eighty to ninety percent of young people who regularly smoke will become
addicted to the nicotine229 and, of this group, one third will die from
illnesses caused by their smoking.230 Currently, 400,000 Americans die
every year from tobacco-caused illnesses.23' In comparison, 46,000
American soldiers were killed during the fourteen years of the Vietnam
War.
232
Congress has refused to act on this issue in any meaningful manner
and has preempted the states from taking any action with respect to the
advertising or promotion of cigarettes.233 Given that the tobacco industry
can afford to spend $6.2 billion every year on advertising and promotion
234of its products, it is not difficult to imagine that the industry is equally
generous regarding the reelection efforts of enough key members of
Congress to ensure the defeat of all meaningful reform legislation. As a
result, the tobacco industry has been left to regulate itself.
In response, the FDA has claimed jurisdiction over the issue by
declaring nicotine a drug, thus enabling it to regulate cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products. The proposed rule presents two sets of legal
issues. First, is the proposed rule constitutional? As discussed above, this
Comment concludes that it is. Commercial speech is given only limited
protection under the Constitution. If the government can show that its
restriction will directly advance a substantial governmental interest, and the
228. See SGR 1994, supra note 5.
229. See supra text accompanying note 149.
230. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,338 (1995).
231. See DHHS, Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality, supra note 1, at 645.
232. RICHARD B. MORRIS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 505 (1976).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994); Id. § 4406(b).
234. See supra note 39.
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restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective, the
restriction will be upheld. 35
Second, does the FDA have jurisdiction to regulate in this area? As
discussed above, this Comment concludes that it does. The FDA has the
power to regulate "drugs" and drug delivery "devices" under the FDCA.
The FDA has determined that nicotine, which causes addiction and other
psychoactive effects, is a "drug" because it is an article "intended to affect
•.. any function of the body." '236 Similarly, nicotine-containing tobacco
products are "devices" under the same definition.237
In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that if the intent of Congress is
not clear, the reviewing court must defer to the agency's reasonable
statutory interpretation. 38 Here, Congress may preclude FDA jurisdiction
concerning tobacco regulations at any time. However, it is not clear that
Congress has intended yet to do so. The preemption clauses of the two
federal statutes concerning tobacco regulation 239 are narrowly drafted and
do not preclude other agencies, including the FDA, from regulating in the
area of tobacco promotion and sales. In matters involving technically
complex issues within the agency's expertise, a reviewing court must give
substantial deference to the agency's reasonable interpretation of the federal
statute.240 Here, the FDA's interpretation that nicotine is a drug and
tobacco products are devices, under their respective definitions in the
FDCA, is reasonable. As such, the reviewing court should give effect to
the FDA's interpretation.
A final consideration is whether the FDA proposed rule is sound
public policy. Because this question is not legally based, it is beyond both
the scope of this legal analysis and the District Court's scope of
reviewability. However, it merits consideration.
Most people would agree that children under eighteen should not be
permitted to smoke or use smokeless tobacco products. Indeed, the law in
every state prohibits them from doing so. But four million of them still use
these products, and the number increases every year. The meager efforts
expended have not been successful. The FDA proposed rule seeks to take
several major steps to address the problem. To buy cigarettes, minors
235. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Conm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-
64 (1980).
236. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3) (1994).
237. Id. § 321(g)(1)(C).
238. 467 U.S. at 865.
239. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994); Id. § 4406.
240. Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).
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would need picture identification to prove that they are at least eighteen
and they could only purchase from sales clerks, not from vending machines
or other indirect sales methods. The proposal would also eliminate the
barrage of pro-tobacco advertisements featuring "cool" camel cartoons,
"rugged" cowboys, and "victorious" race car drivers--images that play to
young people's natural insecurities, enticing them to begin smoking or
using smokeless tobacco.
These measures will not solve the problem entirely. The FDA hopes
to cut the rate of underage tobacco use in half-a reasonable goal. 4 ' As
a result, the proposed rule would preserve millions of lives in the future,
save the American public an estimated twenty-eight to forty-three billion
dollars per year from reduced medical costs, productivity gains from
reduced morbidity, and averted premature fatalities. 42 Notwithstanding
the inevitable costs and inconvenience to tobacco manufacturers, adver-
tisers, and vendors, the tremendous benefits the regulations would have on
the nation in general make the proposal most worthwhile.
Charles J. Harder*
241. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995).
242. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,359 (1995).
* The author would like to thank Professor William Araiza for his assistance, as well as the
staff and editors of the Entertainment Law Journal, notably Tamara Kapan and Cynthia Barnes.
This Comment is dedicated to those who work to protect the health and welfare of America's
youth.
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